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THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S NEW STANDARD FOR STRIKE
MISCONDUCT DISCHARGES: NLRB v.




N NLRB v. W. C. McQuaide, Inc.' the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit enunciated a new legal standard of great
consequence in the field of labor relations law. The McQuaide court
rejected the longstanding test of the National Labor Relations
Board (Board) for determining whether an employee's strike activity
constitutes sufficient grounds for his discharge,2 and established a
set of criteria which broadens an employer's right to terminate
recalcitrant strikers.3 This new standard can be expected to have a
significant impact, within the Third Circuit as well as in other
circuits, on the nature of picket-line conduct.
Traditionally, the Board has adhered to the principle that a
striking employee cannot be legally discharged from his job for
uttering threats or other abusive language during the course of a
strike unless these statements are accompanied by physical acts or
gestures that provide added emphasis or meaning to the verbal
remarks. 4 Where a striking employee has been discharged merely
because of oral threats, the Board has consistently ordered his
reinstatement with backpay, regardless of the context in which the
t B.S., Villanova University, 1964; J.D., University of Pennsylvania School of
Law, 1967. Member, Pennsylvania Bar.
Mr. Cabot was counsel for respondent in NLRB v. W. C. McQuaide, Inc., 552
F.2d 519 (1977), the case which is discussed in this article.
f B.A., Duke University, 1972; J.D., Temple University School of Law, 1975.
Member, Pennsylvania Bar.
1. 552 F.2d 519 (3d Cir. 1977). The case was heard before Circuit Judges Gibbons
and Garth and District Judge Cohen, sitting by designation. Judge Garth wrote the
opinion of the court.
2. For a discussion of the Board's test, see notes 4-6 and accompanying text
infra.
3. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's new standard, see notes 77-81 and
accompanying text infra.
4. See, e.g., W. C. McQuaide, Inc., 220 N.L.R.B. 593 (1975); Valley Oil Co., 210
N.L.R.B. 370 (1974); Federal Prescription Serv., Inc., 203 N.L.R.B. 975 (1973); Capital
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threats were made.5 In rejecting the Board's test, the Third Circuit in
McQuaide substituted an "objective" standard, which turns upon
whether, under all of the circumstances surrounding the strike, the
misconduct "reasonably tend[s] to coerce or intimidate" other
employees. 6
The importance of the McQuaide standard for strike misconduct
discharges has already been demonstrated by its acceptance in
another circuit. In Associated Grocers of New England, Inc. v.
NLRB,7 the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
relied upon the McQuaide standard and reversed a Board order to
reinstate striking employees who had been discharged for strike
misconductA
This article will review the factual and procedural history of
McQuaide and assess the impact of the Third Circuit's decision. In
order to fully comprehend and appreciate the importance of the new
standard announced by McQuaide, however, the rights and
responsibilities of an employer with respect to striking employees
must first be understood.
II. AN EMPLOYER'S OBLIGATION TO STRIKING EMPLOYEES
Both the Board and the federal courts distinguish among
various types of strikes based upon the purposes for which they are
instigated and maintained.9 Work stoppages are usually precipitated
by a dispute over economic issues, by an employer's commission of
an unfair labor practice, or by a desire on the part of employees
and/or an organizing union to gain collective bargaining status.
Each of these purposes has given rise to a different form of strike.
A strike is "economic" if employees strike for the purpose of
securing higher wages and other favorable contract provisions. 10
Another form of an economic strike is a "recognitional" strike,
which is usually initiated as part of a union organizational effort,
and is designed to pressure the employer into recognizing the union
as the employees' representative." An "unfair labor practice" strike
5. See, e.g., W. C. McQuaide, Inc., 220 N.L.R.B. 593 (1975); Valley Oil Co., 210
N.L.R.B. 370 (1974); Capital Rubber & Specialty Co., 201 N.L.R.B. 715 (1973).
6. 552 F.2d at 528. See notes 77-81 and accompanying text infra.
7. 562 F.2d 1333 (lst Cir. 1977).
8. Id. at 1336. For a discussion of Associated Grocers, see notes 90795 and
accompanying text infra.
9. See R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAw 339 (1976).
10. NLRB v. Thayer Co., 213 F.2d 748, 750 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 883
(1954). See R. GORMAN, supra note 9, at 339.
11. R. GORMAN, supra note 9, at 339. See 552 F.2d at 528.
[VOL. 23: p. 645
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occurs where the employees' work stoppage is motivated, at least in
part, by the employer's commission of an unfair labor practice. 12
Since the nature of a strike dictates an employer's obligation to
striking workers who wish to return to their jobs, the distinction
between these various types of strikes is important. Employees
participating in an unfair labor practice strike cannot be perman-
ently replaced because an employer is obligated to reinstate all
unfair labor practice strikers who unconditionally apply for
reinstatement.13 Moreover, any replacements hired during an unfair
labor practice strike must be discharged at the end of the work
stoppage, if necessary, to make room for returning strikers.14 In
contrast, an employer may permanently replace employees who are
involved in an economic strike.' 5 Economic strikers who uncondi-
tionally apply for reinstatement are entitled to return to work only if
and when a vacancy occurs, but they must be placed on a
preferential hiring list until they secure other employment that is
regular and substantially equivalent. 6
For the purposes of McQuaide, the most essential principle is
that in any type of strike - economic, unfair labor practice or
recognitional - an employer may not be obligated to reinstate
striking employees who engage in activity that amounts to "strike
misconduct.' 7 Therefore, an employer's duty to reinstate, employees
12. R. GORMAN, supra note 9, at 339.
13. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 278 (1956).
14. Id. at 277-78. See R. GORMAN, supra note 9, at 341.
15. NLRB v. MacKay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938). See R.
GORMAN, supra note 9, at 431-32.
16. NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 381 (1967). See Laidlaw Corp. v.
NLRB, 414 F.2d 99, 103 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970); R. GORMAN,
supra note 9, at 343-49.
17. See NLRB v. Cambria Clay Prod. Co., 215 F.2d 48,54 (6th Cir. 1954); NLRB v.
Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 118 F.2d 874, 888 (lst Cir. 1941); NLRB v. Elkland Leather
Co., 114 F.2d 221, 225 (3d Cir. 1940); Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 107 F.2d 472, 479
(3d Cir. 1939); NLRB v. Stackpole Carbon Co., 105 F.2d 167, 176 (3d Cir. 1939). The
rationale for not compelling an employer to reinstate employees who participate in
"strike misconduct" was explained by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Fansteel
Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939). The Court noted: "To justify such conduct
because of the existence of a labor dispute or of an unfair labor practice would be to
put a premium on resort to force instead of legal remedies and to subvert the
principles of law and order which lie at the foundation of society." Id. at 253. See
NLRB v. Drivers Local 639, 362 U.S. 274, 281 (1960).
It should be noted that an employer's right to refuse reinstatement to a striker
who engages in strike misconduct may not be automatic. If the misconduct occurs
during an unfair labor practice strike, the Board must balance the striker's
misconduct with the employer's initial unfair labor practice before deciding whether
the striker can be discharged. See R. GORMAN, supra note 9, at 349-50. Likewise, an
employer may be required to reinstate an economic striker who engaged in strike
misconduct under the doctrine of condonation. See id. at 350-53. According to this
doctrine, if an employer demonstrates its willingness to condone the misconduct of
striking employees, they are entitled to reinstatement. Id. at 350-51. However,
3
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frequently depends upon whether the strikers engaged in strike
misconduct. In an effort to clarify the employer's obligation with
respect to striking employees who wish to return to their jobs, the
Third Circuit in McQuaide addressed the issue of what type of
conduct is sufficiently egregious to constitute "strike misconduct."18
III. THE BACKGROUND OF McQuaide: THE STRIKE
AND ITS AFTERMATH
The circumstances which led the Third Circuit to examine the
issue of strike misconduct serve to explain the new standard
articulated by the court. W. C. McQuaide, Inc. (Company) operated a
trucking business in Johnstown, Pennsylvania and employed nearly
300 workers. 19 Early in 1974, the International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America
Local 110 (Union) initiated an organizational campaign among the
Company's employees. 20 Claiming that it represented a majority of
the employees, the Union demanded recognition on April 1, 1974.21
Upon the Company's refusal to grant recognition,2 2 between 120-150
employees went on strike and began picketing.23 According to the
findings of the Board, the purpose of the strike was to obtain
recognition for the Union or a representational election, and to
improve wages and working conditions. 24
During the course of the strike, the operation of the Company's
trucking business was seriously impaired.25 Due to the labor
"condonation may not be lightly presumed from mere silence or equivocal statements,
but must clearly appear from some positive act by an employer indicating forgiveness
and an intention of treating guilty employees as if their misconduct had not
occurred." NLRB v. Marshall Car Wheel & Foundry Co., 218 F.2d 409, 414 (5th Cir.
1955).
18. 552 F.2d at 527. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's holding, see notes
58-89 and accompanying text infra.
19. 552 F.2d at 523.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. After its request for recognition had been denied, the Union filed a
representation petition with the Board in order to secure an election. Id.
23. Id. Most of the picketing occurred at the Company's trucking terminal in
Johnstown, Pennsylvania, but the Union also maintained roving pickets at the
Company's delivery points. Id. Specifically, the Board found that the strikers "began
to picket the entrances to the terminal ... and at other locations. The Union also
employed roving pickets whose object it was to picket McQuaide trucks at various
delivery points." W. C. McQuaide, Inc., 220 N.L.R.B. 593, 596 (1975).
24. W. C. McQuaide, Inc., 220 N.L.R.B. 593, 596 (1975). Although the Board made
no specific determination as to the type of strike the employees had participated in,
the Third Circuit concluded that the work stoppage was "an economic strike to secure
union recognition." 552 F.2d at 528. See text accompanying notes 10-11 supra.
25. 552 F.2d at 523.
4
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shortage caused by the strike, the Company hired additional workers
and transferred other employees to the jobs held by the strikers in an
effort to continue business on a limited basis.26 The strike was also
marked by a substantial degree of violence. In addition to frequent
physical confrontations and verbal assaults between striking and
nonstriking employees, 27 the Company's property sustained substan-
tial damage.28 Although the violence could not be directly traced to
the Union, 29 these events provide an important backdrop for viewing
the parties' conduct throughout the strike.
On April 24, 1974, the Company obtained a temporary restrain-
ing order in the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County,
Pennsylvania, directed against the Union, certain named union
officers and twenty-six named strikers. 30 Shortly thereafter the
Company petitioned the Court of Common Pleas to hold seven of the
striking employees in contempt of the temporary restraining order.
31
On May 7, 1974, the court found these seven individuals in violation
of the injunction, held them in contempt and levied fines against
each, ranging from $50 to $100.32
The seven employees who had been held in contempt were
advised by the Company on May 19, 1974 that they were
discharged. 33 The Company based the terminations on the strikers'
unlawful conduct, which was proved in part by the contempt
citations issued by the Court of Common Pleas.34 The validity of
three of these discharges became the central issue in McQuaide.35
Harry Lavely was discharged for directing threats of physical injury
26. 220 N.L.R.B. at 596, 597-98.
27. Id. at 603-06.
28. 552 F.2d at 523. Describing the damage to the Company's property, the Third
Circuit stated: "Truck windshields were smashed, air hoses were cut and a warehouse,
airplane and hangar was burned . " Id.
29. Id.
30. See 220 N.L.R.B. at 596-97. The Board described the terms of the temporary
restraining order as follows:
This order forbade unlawfully inducing or unlawfully causing any individual to
engage in picketing in the course of the labor dispute in progress; forbade mass
picketing at specified locations; forbade causing injury to the person of any
individual or to McQuaide's property in connection with the labor dispute; and
forbade the threatening of individuals with personal injury or threatening injury





33. Id. at 598.
34. Id.
35. See 552 F.2d at 526-28. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's resolution of
this issue, see notes 58-89 and accompanying text infra.
5
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at three of the Company's nonstriking employees. 36 The misconduct
which resulted in John Geisel's termination consisted of a series of
hostile acts and verbal threats.3 7 Similarly, Frank Petrosky was
discharged for verbally threatening two nonstriking employees
while they were making deliveries for the Company.
38
In October 1974, after the conclusion of the strike,39 the Union
filed unfair labor practice charges against the Company.40 The
Union alleged, inter alia,41 that the Company violated sections 8(a) (1)
36. 220 N.L.R.B. at 605-06. Specifically, Lavely was accused of following a
nonstriking employee, attempting to stop his vehicle and then accosting the worker at
a delivery site, where Lavely shook his fist and stated that the strikers would "get
him." Id. at 605. Lavely also shook his fist at another Company employee and called
him a "f... ing scab," warning that the strikers would "knock the goddamn a... out
of [him]. . . ." if he continued to drive. 552 F.2d at 526. Finally, Lavely threatened a
third employee with "[s]cab, you're going to get yours," and then temporarily
positioned his truck in a manner which prevented the employee from leaving a
delivery site. 220 N.L.R.B. at 605-06.
37. 220 N.L.R.B. at 604, 605. Geisel was accused of suddenly swerving his truck in
front of an oncoming Company vehicle. Id. at 604. On this occasion, a collision was
barely avoided when Geisel maneuvered his truck away from the Company vehicle at
the last moment. Id. It was also alleged that Geisel twice verbally threatened a
nonstriking employee. 552 F.2d at 526. During one of these encounters, which occurred
a few days after the windshield of a Company truck operated by the employee had
been shattered by a rock, Geisel asked if he had been injured. Id. When the
nonstriking employee replied that he had not been harmed, Geisel retorted, "Maybe
next time you won't be so lucky." Id. In another instance, it was reported that Geisel
stood in the background shouting "scab" and similar epithets, while two other
strikers hammered on the windshield of a Company truck. Id.
38. 555 F.2d at 526. Petrosky called one of the employees a "goddamned rotten
scab," and asked him, "What the hell are you doing in this goddamned truck, I
thought you were coming with us." Id.
39. In addition to discharging the seven individuals for strike misconduct, the
Company took other action during the course of the strike. The Company's major
actions included: 1) permanently replacing 19 striking dockworkers; 2) making
repeated offers of reinstatement to the strikers, which included the Company's
requirements for reinstatement; and 3) interviewing all employees who indicated a
desire to return to work before reinstating them. Id. at 523-24. See 220 N.L.R.B. at
598-600. As a result of these efforts only 25 out of the 120-150 striking employees
were reinstated to their jobs. 552 F.2d at 524.
40. See 552 F.2d at 524-25.
41. The Union also charged that the Company violated § 8(a) (1) and (3) of the
National Labor Relations Act (Act), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1), (3) (1970), by failing to
reinstate 19 dockworkers and other striking employees. 552 F.2d at 525. See note 39
8upra. In addition, the Union alleged that the Company violated § 8(a) (1) of the Act
by coercively interrogating employees who applied for reinstatement. 552 F.2d at 525.
See note 39 supra. For the text of the pertinent sections of the Act, see note 42 infra.
The Board found the Company guilty of these charges, and, as a remedy,
ordered the Company to reinstate the 19 dockworkers and other striking employees
with backpay. 220 N.L.R.B. at 613. On appeal, the Third Circuit remanded the issue of
the 19 replaced dockworkers to the Board for further factual findings in support of the
order of reinstatement. 552 F.2d at 532. As to the other striking employees, the Third
Circuit directed the Board to modify the order requiring reinstatement so that it
applied only to the strikers who had complied with the Company's requirements for
returning to work. Id. at 531. See note 39 supra.
6
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and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act (Act)42 by discharging
the seven strikers. 43 As a result of these charges, a hearing was held
before an Administrative Law Judge (Judge) of the Board.
44
Subsequent thereto, the Judge issued a recommended decision which
largely sustained the Union's charges. 45 Specifically, the Judge
determined that six out of the seven discharges, including the
discharges of Lavely, Petrosky and Geisel,46 were motivated by the
employees' union activities, rather than strike misconduct, and were
therefore unlawful. 47 As to these six employees, the Judge recom-
mended that they be reinstated to their jobs with backpay.48 The
discharge of the seventh striker was deemed justified, based upon a
finding that he had perpetrated serious strike misconduct.
49
The Board reviewed the Judge's recommended decision and
concluded that the Judge erred in finding that six of the terminated
employees had been unlawfully discharged.50 With respect to three of
these individuals - Geisel, Lavely and Petrosky - the Board agreed
with the Judge that their firings were invalid .5 As to the three other
strikers, however, the Board found sufficient evidence of violent
conduct to justify their terminations.
5 2
The Board's determination that Geisel, Lavely and Petrosky
were unlawfully discharged was based upon a longstanding policy
concerning strike misconduct discharges.5 3 In ruling that these three
employees did not engage in strike misconduct which would deprive
them of the Act's protection, the Board stated:
Although there are indications of instances in which they
verbally abused or threatened replacements, this language was
42. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a), (1), (3) (1970). Sections 8(a) (1) and (3) of the Act provide in
pertinent part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section [7] ...
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term
or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization ....
Id.
43. See 552 F.2d at 524-25.
44. See 220 N.L.R.B. at 595.
45. See id. at 595-614.
46. See notes 31-38 and accompanying text supra.
47. See 220 N.L.R.B. at 593.
48. See id. at 613.
49. See id. at 606. This employee's failure to appear at the hearing contributed in
part to the Judge's ruling that he had been properly terminated. Id. at 593.
50. Id. at 594.
51. Id. See notes 36-38 and accompanying text supra.
52. 220 N.L.R.B. at 594.
53. For a discussion of this policy, see text accompanying notes 4-6 supra.
7
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not accompanied by any physical acts or gestures that would
provide added emphasis or meaning to their words sufficient to
warrant finding that they should not be reinstated to their jobs
at the strike's conclusion.5 4
Consequently, the Board ordered the Company to reinstate Geisel,
Lavely and Petrosky with backpay.55
The Company refused to comply with the Board's order,
contending that the findings were not based upon substantial
evidence on the record as a whole.5 6 Therefore, the Board petitioned
the Third Circuit for an enforcement order.57
IV. THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S RESOLUTION OF THE
STRIKE MISCONDUCT ISSUE
The paramount issue considered by the Third Circuit in
McQuaide concerned the discharges of Geisel, Lavely and Petrosky
for strike misconduct.58 It was in the resolution of this issue that the
Third Circuit articulated a new legal standard to test the validity of
discharges based upon strike misconduct.
The court began its discussion by rejecting the standard used by
the Board to review strike misconduct discharges - verbal threats
accompanied by physical acts or gestures 59 - as simply erroneous.6°
In explaining the difficulties with the Board's standard, the court
stated:
We recognize that some confrontations between strikers and
non-strikers are inevitable and that not every impropriety is
grounds for discharge. Moreover, we recognize that it is the
primary responsibility of the Board and not of the courts "to
strike the proper balance between the asserted business
justifications and the invasion of employer rights. . . ." Yet, we
do not believe that an employer must countenance conduct that
amounts to intimidation and threats of bodily harm. Threats are
not protected under the Act, and we fail to see how a threat
acquires protected status simply because it is unaccompanied by
54. 220 N.L.R.B. at 594.
55. Id.
56. 552 F.2d at 526.
57. Id. at 522-23.
58. Id. at 526-28. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's disposition of the other
issues in McQuaide, see note 41 supra.
59. See text accompanying notes 4-6 supra.
60. 552 F.2d at 527..
652 [VOL. 23: p. 645
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physical acts or gestures. The question is whether a threat is
sufficiently egregious not whether there is added emphasis. 61
Having rejected the Board's standard, the Third Circuit
considered several approaches used by other circuits for evaluating
strike misconduct discharges. 62 The court first examined NLRB v.
Efco Manufacturing, Inc.,63 where the First Circuit ruled that a
striker's threat to punch a plant manager did not constitute
adequate grounds for his discharge.64 The basis of the First Circuit's
holding was the manager's lack of any real fear of physical harm.6 5
The Third Circuit also discussed NLRB v. Trumbull Asphalt Co. 66 In
Trumbull, the Eighth Circuit used the same "victim's fear" standard
to hold that threats that placed a nonstriker in such fear of bodily
harm that he did not work for five weeks were sufficiently egregious
to warrant discharge of the perpetrator. 67 The Third Circuit
concluded that this "victim's fear" standard was not satisfactory
because "it focuses on the effect on the non-striker rather than on
the conduct of the striker."68
The court then considered an approach that evaluates the
discharged striker's subjective intent.69 It noted that in NLRB v.
Pepsi Cola Co.,70 the Fourth Circuit denied reinstatement to a striker
who was discharged for warning a prospective strike replacement, "I
know where you live and if you go in there to work, I'll come looking
for you."' 71 The Fourth Circuit concluded that this remark constituted
a veiled threat which crossed the line from mere persuasion to actual
threats and intimidation. 72 The Third Circuit then noted that the
Sixth Circuit, applying the same "striker's intent" standard, reached
a result contrary to Pepsi Cola.73 In NLRB v. Hartman Luggage
61. Id. (footnotes omitted), quoting NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375,
378 (1967).
62. 552 F.2d at 527.
63. 227 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1007 (1956). See 552 F.2d at
527.
64. 227 F.2d at 676.
65. Id.
66. 327 F.2d 841 (8th Cir. 1964). See 552 F.2d at 527.
67. 327 F.2d at 846.
68. 552 F.2d at 527.
69. Id.
70. 496 F.2d 226 (4th Cir. 1974). See 552 F.2d at 527.
71. 496 F.2d at 228-29.
72. Id. at 229. The "striker's intent" standard adopted by the Fourth Circuit
implicitly recognizes that some confrontations between striking and nonstriking
employees is inevitable. See id. at 228. However, when the striker's conduct shifts
from mere argumentative and persuasive support of his position to intentional threats
and intimidations, the striker commits strike misconduct which disqualifies him from
a right to reinstatement. Id.
73. 552 F.2d at 527.
9
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Co.,
7 4 the Sixth Circuit enforced a Board order of reinstatement,
ruling that a striker's remark to a supervisor that it would be a
shame for strikers to kill him amounted to mere picket-line rhetoric
rather than an actual threat.75 After examining both of these
decisions, the Third Circuit also rejected the "striker's intent"
standard.
76
Instead of adopting either of these two approaches, the Third
Circuit decided to invoke a test it had previously enunciated for
violations of section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.77 In Local 542, Interna-
tional Union of Operating Engineers v. NLRB, 78 the Third Circuit
set forth its section 8(b) (A) standard, stating:
That no one was in fact coerced or intimidated is of no
relevance. The test of coercion and intimidation is not whether
the misconduct proves effective. The test is whether the
misconduct is such that, under the circumstances existing, it
may reasonably tend to coerce or intimidate employees in the
exercise of rights protected under the Act.79
The McQuaide court concluded that this test was "equally applica-
ble" to the "analogous" situation of strike misconduct.8° The court
described the standard adopted in McQuaide as "an objective
standard to determine whether conduct constitutes a threat suffi-
ciently egregious to justify an employer's refusal to reinstate."8'
Applying this standard to the three discharges declared
unlawful by the Board, 2 the Third Circuit concluded that the Board
properly ordered the reinstatement of Geisel and Petrosky.8
3
74. 453 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1971).
75. Id. at 184-85.
76. 552 F.2d at 527.
77. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1) (A) (1970). Section 8(b) (1) (A) makes it an unfair labor
practice for a union to restrain or coerce the exercise of the right of employees to
organize and bargain collectively. Id.
78. 328 F.2d 850 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 826 (1964).
79. 328 F.2d at 852-53.
80. 552 F.2d at 528.
81. Id. at 527.
82. For a discussion of the Board's holding, see text accompanying notes 53-55
supra.
83. 552 F.2d at 528. With respect to Petrosky, the court found that he merely used
abusive language which did not deprive him of the Act's protection. Id. See note 38
and accompanying text supra. The finding is consistent with other decisions on strike
misconduct discharges. See, e.g., Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53,
60-61 (1966) (absent a deliberate intention to falsify, epithets such as "scab," "unfair"
and "liar" do not remove strikers from the Act's protection); NLRB v. Cement
Transport, Inc., 490 F.2d 1024, 1030 n.7 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 828 (1974)
(employee's reference to company president as a "son-of-a-b..." was not egregious or
out of context in a labor struggle); Crown Central Petroleum Corp. v. NLRB, 430 F.2d
654 [VOL. 23: p. 645
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However, using the same test to evaluate Lavely's strike activities,,4
the court held that "substantial evidence on the record indicates...
that Lavely's conduct constituted threats which could reasonably
tend to coerce or intimidate. 85 Therefore, the court ruled that the
Board erred in ordering his reinstatement.
8 6
The Third Circuit noted that Lavely physically followed one
employee to a delivery point and threatened to "get him," shook his
fist at and verbally threatened to harm another employee, and
threatened and blocked the egress of a third employee.8 7 The court
concluded that "[i]n the context of the strike, which was marked by
incidents of vandalism and harassment, and under the circumstan-
ces in which the statements were made, Lavely's conduct was not
merely spontaneous picket-line activity."88  Consequently, the
Board's request for enforcement of the order to reinstate Lavely was
denied.89
V. CONCLUSION: THE PROGENY OF McQuaide
The significance of McQuaide has already become quite evident.
In September 1977, the First Circuit, in Associated Grocers of New
England, Inc. v. NLRB, 90 rejected the Board's strike misconduct
standard and replaced it with the test enunciated in McQuaide.91
The Board in Associated Grocers ordered reinstatement of an
employee who was discharged for verbally threatening the lives of
724, 730-31 (5th Cir. 1970) (statement that plant manager operated the plant in a
totalitarian manner similar to Castro was not egregious).
Turning to Geisel, the Third Circuit ruled that his statement to a nonstriking
employee that he might not be so lucky the next time was "too ambiguous to
reasonably tend to coerce or intimidate." 552 F.2d at 528. See note 37 and
accompanying text supra.
84. See note 36 and accompanying text supra.
85. 552 F.2d at 528.
86. Id. See text accompanying notes 53-55 supra.
87. 552 F.2d at 528. See note 36 supra.
88. 552 F.2d at 528.
89. Id.
90. 562 F.2d 1333 (1st Cir. 1977). Associated Grocers arose from the circumstances
surrounding an economic strike by 189 employees. Id. at 1335. The strike, which
continued for three months, was marked by sporadic violence throughout its duration.
Id. After the strike ended, the employer discharged four employees and suspended five
others for alleged strike misconduct which included verbal threats and acts of
intimidation. Id. Unfair labor practice charges were filed against the employer, and
the Board eventually ordered reinstatement with backpay for all nine employees. Id.
The Board's decision was based upon findings that three of these individuals had
made no threats at all and that each of the other employees had merely uttered
threats which were not accompanied by any physical acts or gestures. See id. at
1335-36. The First Circuit disagreed with the Board as to the validity of two of the
nine discharges in light of the McQuaide test. Id. at 1336. See text accompanying
notes 92-95 infra.
91. 562 F.2d at 1336.
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three job applicants during the strike.92 Noting that these threats
were made approximately twenty-five feet from a picket line
comprising forty to fifty strikers, the First Circuit refuted the
Board's reliance upon the absence of any accompanying physical
acts or gestures and ruled that the discharge was valid. 93 Citing
McQuaide, the court concluded that this conduct, "which was clearly
such as would reasonably tend to coerce or intimidate," was not
protected by the Act.94 The First Circuit also remanded for further
factual findings in light of the McQuaide standard a Board order to
reinstate another employee who had been discharged for making
verbal threats.
95
By not requiring the presence of physical acts or gestures to find
strike misconduct sufficient to support the discharge of a striking
employee, the Third Circuit in McQuaide took a major step in the
direction of reducing picket-line violence and strengthening the
employer's hand in dealing with recalcitrant strikers. In the future,
employers within the Third Circuit and other circuits that adopt the
McQuaide strike misconduct standard will have far broader
authority to discharge and otherwise discipline strikers who resort to
verbal threats and intimidation.
In addition, McQuaide provides administrative law judges, as
well as the Board and the reviewing courts, with a simpler and more
objective method for adjudging picket-line misconduct. Rather than
attempting to assess the striker's intent to harm or the victim's
fears, 96 administrative law judges and reviewing tribunals need only
apply the McQuaide "reasonableness" standard to the circumstan-
ces of the particular case. In the words of the Third Circuit, where
"'the misconduct is such that, under the circumstances existing, it
may reasonably tend to coerce or intimidate employees in the
exercise of rights protected under the Act,' "197 discharge or other
disciplinary measures are appropriate.
It is hoped that decisions such as McQuaide and its progeny will
help to eliminate the volatile atmosphere that frequently pervades
labor disputes. If this is indeed a result of McQuaide, the field of
labor relations in the United States will have been well-served.
92. See id. at 1337.
93. Id. at 1336.
94. Id. at 1337.
95. Id. at 1336.
96. See text accompanying notes 63-76 supra.
97. 552 F.2d at 528, quoting Local 542, Int'l Union of Operating Eng. v. NLRB,
328 F.2d 850, 852-53 (3d Cir. 1964).
[VOL. 23: p. 645
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